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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, : Case No. 950033-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). The supreme court had original 
jurisdiction over this case, an appeal of a first degree felony, 
see Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (i), but the matter was transferred to 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief 
or in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e) (1) 
Rule 4-201(1)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-201(2)(H) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-201(2)(I) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-201(2) (K) (ii) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-508 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether, due to technical problems with the court 
reporter's machinery, a new trial is required because there is 
nothing more than a blank tape to reflect the entire voir dire 
proceedings and appellate counsel is left with no means of 
properly identifying and preparing issues relating to jury 
selection? (R 100-07) (issue preserved following court 
reporter's admission that voir dire proceedings could not be 
transcribed); Addendum B. "Because the resolution of this case 
depends entirely on questions of law, we accord no particular 
deference to the rulings of the [lower] courts . . . on any of 
the points presented." Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 
455, 456 (Utah 1989); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 
1991) ("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the 
law"). 
2. Is a harmless error analysis either (a) inapplicable 
here because the threshold requirement of reviewability was not 
met, or (b) incorrect under controlling authority which suggests 
a contrary analysis. Issue raised in Appellee's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Reversal. This is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See citations 
above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-103, and theft, a third degree felony, in 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Robert L. Newey on temporary appointment, presiding. (R 89-90; 
97-98). 
A court reporter was not present during the proceedings. 
Instead, the proceedings were recorded by videotape. (R 32) . 
The record contains a Videotape Record Log of Proceedings, but no 
minute entry for each of the three days of trial. (R 32-33, 36-
38) . 
Missing from the record is at least one hour and forty-five 
minutes of the on-the-record videotaped proceedings. (R 32). 
The log and the person responsible for transcription both reveal 
that the entire voir dire was not recorded. (R 32). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 17, 1994, at approximately 7:15 a.m., smoke was seen 
coming out of a Skipper's restaurant on Redwood Road. (R 129, 
132). Fire investigators noticed that the drive-up window 
remained open, (R 374) , even though the business should have been 
closed. (R 218). 
The night before the fire, Jennie Reed, the "in-charge 
closer" responsible for securing the building, believed that the 
doors and windows had been locked. (R 167-68). However, Jennie 
was responsible for at least fifteen tasks and she may have 
forgotten to properly secure the premises. Cf. (R 625-26) (she 
wanted to close quickly in order to go out with a friend). 
In addition, Jennie noted that the window was secured with 
3 
only one piece of wood instead of the usual two sticks. (R 187) . 
Since one piece was missing, one part of the window was more 
susceptible to being opened than the other. (R 187). 
Such windows, when hit in the right spot, would pop open. 
(R 245). According to Alan Meldrum, the manager of Skipper's, 
while that popping had not yet happened to the Skipper's on 
Redwood Road, it had "happened at a couple of [other] Skipper's." 
(R 245). 
Based on the assumption that Jennie did in fact properly set 
the fire alarm and lock the safe, the State argued that the fire 
was an "inside job". (R 600). Jennie claimed to have deposited 
approximately $1000 in the safe that night. (R 173); (R 202) 
($941.02 was determined to be missing). 
Jennie Reed, Alan Meldrum, David Tippits, Becky VanDoran 
McClain, Victoria Rondas, Allen Russell, and Angie Davis all had 
access to the building key, the safe combination, and the alarm 
code. (R 208-09, 223); (R 180, 187-88, 191); (the combination 
was known by "the manager, the assistant manager and . . . it's 
not unusual for key hourly employees to be put into positions of 
responsibility and have that information as well"). 
One set of building keys were shared and rotated among the 
employees. (R 224). The keys were suppose to be left in the 
safe at night, but the State did not establish that the keys 
still were in the safe at the time of the fire. (R 226-27) . The 
State also did not prove that the keys had not been copied or 
that the alarm code or safe combination had not been conveyed to 
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other parties. 
Even though there was no motive shown for the arson, (R 
597), Allen Russell was targeted. Allen derived no benefits from 
the insurance and the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting 
bad feelings with the restaurant or its employees (or customers). 
At or about the time of the fire, Allen was up in 
Butterfield Canyon with Linda Martinez and her cousin, Jamie. 
(R 487, 506-09). During past outings at a bowling alley, Allen, 
25, had noticed Linda and wanted to get to know her. (R 506). 
Because the attraction appeared to be mutual, Allen and Linda 
agreed to go for a drive. (R 506-07). Jamie accompanied them. 
(R 508). State investigator Murdock failed to check the bowling 
alley to determine if the two girls could be located. (R 589). 
When Allen was asked about his activities that evening, he 
did not disclose that he had been with Linda because she had an 
warrant outstanding. (R 524). Since Allen did not want Linda to 
get in trouble, (R 525), he referred to somebody else instead of 
Linda as an alibi. (R 341, 525) . 
The State's case centered on Allen Russell because they 
believed that he was hiding something--which in fact he was at 
first due to his wrongly held belief that he should protect 
Linda. (R 524-25). Allen's misplaced intentions, however, were 
perceived incorrectly as covering up for himself rather than for 
her. 
The State also emphasized his absence from work the day 
before the fire when Allen was simply consoling a despondent 
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friend who had just lost his job. (R 182, 500-01). In light of 
the fact that Allen already had wanted to pursue more education 
and a different job at a lumber company, he spent some time with 
his friend, Darin, instead of going to work. (R 501-02) . 
A security guard at a business in the vicinity of the 
Skipper's restaurant indicated that a truck similar to one owned 
by Darin was seen in the area before the fire. (R 266, 268). 
Darin had lent a truck to Allen who, in turn, drove it up to 
Butterfield Canyon. (R 507). The State, however, suggested that 
the guard saw Darin's truck. 
The guard only saw the truck for 15 to 3 0 seconds and he 
"really wasn't paying attention" to the driver. (R 273). The 
truck seen by the guard, however, did not have a "shell" on it 
which distinguished it from Darin's truck. (R 274). Moreover, 
even if the cumbersome shell had been secured by removable nuts 
and bolts, the State did not show how a person could single-
handedly lift, lower, and raise the awkward and heavy object 
without damaging or marking it. No other persons were charged 
with the offense and other employees were subject to only minimal 
inquiries by investigators. (R 108); see, e.g. (R 175, 197,) 
(Jennie Reed said she was sleeping; Floyd Oberg stated he was at 
home; Alan Meldrum also claimed to be at home). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Absent a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings, 
defense counsel cannot provide Mr. Russell with his 
constitutionally and statutorily based right to appeal. Existing 
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authority requires that record transcripts, while they do not 
have to be perfect, must be complete enough to allow for review. 
This reviewability requirement allows counsel to properly raise 
or identify appellate issues and the requirement has not been 
complied with here. 
The State's argument of harmless error need not be reached 
in the case at bar because such an analysis only comes into play 
after a threshold determination is made that the transcript is in 
fact adequate enough to allow for appellate review. Moreover, 
controlling United States Supreme Court opinions suggest a result 
contrary to a position which purports to require a showing of 
prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE MISSING 
TRANSCRIPTS AND THE INABILITY TO PROPERLY PRESENT 
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
The parties do not dispute that the voir dire proceedings 
were not transcribed. According to the court reporter: 
For the record, after search of the first day of trial 
and having the clerks search the original archived 
videotape, the requested jury voir dire has been found 
to be an hour and 45 minutes of blank tape. I have 
rec[ei]ved instructions from appellant to transcribe 
what is on tape. I have also notified the AOC and 
Mr. Jones, prosecutor, and Judge Newey of this event. 
See State v. Russell, Trial No. 941901057 ("Reporter's Transcript 
Acknowledgement") (attached as Addendum B); (R 127). On remand 
the parties attempted to reconstruct the missing proceeding, but 
were unable to do so. See State v. Russell, Case No. 950033-CA, 
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Motion to Set Briefing Schedule, (Utah App. filed September 25, 
1995). 
As discussed below, a new trial is required due to the 
absence of a complete record and the inability of counsel to 
properly raise and identify issues relating to jury selection. 
See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983); Utah Code Ann. § 
77-1-6(1) (g) (providing for "the right to appeal in all cases11); 
cf. State v. Tuttie, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) (construing the 
right to appeal under Utah Const, art. I, § 12, and noting the 
greater state constitutional approach under the due process 
clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, and equal protection provision, 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24); Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5; Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 
277 (1964).x 
1
 Other supreme court opinions have noted that defendants 
are entitled to a complete transcript or its functional 
equivalent to pursue their appeals. See Britt v. North Carolina, 
404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 
(1969); Gardiner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) 
(rejecting contention that it is adequate to require appellant to 
rely on memory); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967); 
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958) 
(per curiam); Griffin v. Illinois,, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). 
Supportive decisions from other states include Ex parte 
Steen, 431 So.2d 1385 (Ala. 1983); State v. Hart, 514 P.2d 1243 
(Ariz. 1973); State v. Madrid, 510 P.2d 50 (Ariz. App. 1973); 
People v. Serrato, 47 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. App. 1965); People v. 
Killpack, 793 P.2d 642, 643 (Colo. App. 1990); Lucero v. State, 
564 So.2d 158 (Fla. App. 1990) (per curiam); Montford v. State, 
298 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ga. 1982); People v. Seals, 302 N.E.2d 701 
(111. App. 1973); State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 1143 (La. 1980); 
Harshaw v. State, 436 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1981); State v. Moore, 
534 P.2d 1124 (N.M. 1975); People v. Hall, 608 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404-
05 (App. Div. 1994) (per curiam); Gibbs v. State, 214 P. 745 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1928); Commonwealth v. Shields, 383 A.2d 844, 
846-47 (Pa. 1978); Elliott v. State, 435 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tenn. 
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State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), directly 
addresses the involved transcript issue. In Taylor, appellant 
argued: 
that the voir dire examination of potential jurors . . . 
was inadequate both for a determination of actual bias 
as a basis for dismissals for cause and for the 
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. He 
further suggests . . . that numerous deficiencies in the 
trial transcript make it impossible for this Court to 
adequately review these threshold claims. We agree. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added); see also id. at 447 
("In view of our holding that a new trial is required because of 
our inability to review the appellant's claims about the voir 
dire on an inadequate record, we need not address those claims in 
any detail"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (g) (providing for "the 
right to appeal in all cases") . 
Although in Taylor the prospective juror's actual bias was 
never conclusively established and the threshold claims of 
inadequate voir dire remained unresolved, see also infra note 2, 
the supreme court agreed that the deficiencies in the record were 
in and of themselves an appropriate basis for a new trial. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445. 
This Court is similarly unable to review Mr. Russell's 
claims about the voir dire because of the inadequate record. See 
Addendum B (wherein the court reporter noted that "the requested 
jury voir dire has been found to be an hour and 45 minutes of 
blank tape"); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ("By 
1968); Seliger v. State, 138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940); 
State v. Perry, 381 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. 1985); Bearpaw v. State, 803 
P.2d 70, 77-79 (Wyo. 1990). 
9 
allowing the trial court to prevent petitioners from having 
stenographic support or its equivalent for presentation of each 
of their separate contentions to the appellate tribunal, the 
State of Washington has denied them the rights assured them by 
this Court's decisions . . . " ) ; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 
277, 282 (1964) ("We conclude that this counsel's duty cannot be 
discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony and 
evidence presented by the defendant and also the court's charge 
to the jury, as well as the testimony and evidence presented by 
the prosecution"). 
Indeed, the complete absence of a voir dire transcript makes 
Mr. Russell's case especially compelling because the reversal in 
Taylor occurred even though a partial transcript still was 
available for review. Compare Addendum B, with 664 P.2d at 445-
47.2 
2
 In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), the juror 
in question, Ms. Linford, indicated that she "would try" to be 
fair and impartial in a trial which involved pornographic 
material. Id. at 447. No actual bias was reflected in Linford's 
recorded voir dire although her inaudible or omitted responses 
were subject to clarification. For example: 
THE COURT: . . . Do you think you could be completely fair 
and impartial, after hearing and viewing the evidence, 
listening to the law, render a verdict concerning the case? 
MRS. LINFORD: (Due to a continuing background noise, it is 
impossible to hear her response.) 
THE COURT: Well, that's what we're asking. I know that the 
thought might be discomforting to some of you. As I've 
mentioned, there's many cases that are discomforting to 
juries. 
Now, the question is, could you do it and be completely 
fair and impartial as it involves the charge, the evidence 
and the laws the Court will state to you? 
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State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1992) (Menzies I) 
is consistent with Taylor. In Menzies T, Menzies challenged a 
trial court ruling which required him to show that "transcription 
errors prejudiced [his] appeal". 845 P.2d at 228. 
The supreme court acknowledged some errors, but its ability 
to review the record was unhampered. "[W]hile it is true that 
the record contains transcription errors, the mere existence of 
such errors does not mandate a new trial." Id. at 228. "The 
errors [were] obvious in nature and reconcilable when viewed in 
the context of the relevant passage or by referring to 
documentary evidence, and none have any bearing upon issues 
raised on appeal. Furthermore, it is possible to cure any 
conceivably prejudicial errors without retrying the case." Id. 
at 229; cf. id. at 233 (unlike in the case at bar, in 
MRS. LINFORD: (Inaudible response). 
THE COURT: Do you think you could be fair and impartial? 
MRS. LINFORD: (Inaudible response). 
THE COURT: All right. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445-46. 
The district court, which reviewed the Taylor case after it 
had been tried in circuit court, "observed that 'the [circuit] 
court must have been satisfied that her [juror Linford's] answers 
were sufficiently affirmative to leave her on the panel.'" 664 
P.2d at 447. The district court denied Mr. Taylor's motion for a 
new trial and it affirmed Taylor's circuit court conviction. Id. 
at 440, 447. On appeal to the supreme court, however, the high 
court refused to assume the content of juror Linford's answers. 
Id. at 447. Further, as stated above, the inadequacy of the 
transcript on voir dire--standing alone--provided the grounds for 
a new trial. Id.; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). 
11 
Menzies I appellant "did not object to any juror on any basis 
related to the missing testimony"). 
In Mr. Russell's appeal, the 1 hour and 45 minute blank tape 
may not be "reconciled" or "cured". The State does not dispute 
that during Mr. Russell's aggravated arson trial, he challenged 
for cause a prospective juror whose "parents may have been the 
victims of arson when some of their property was destroyed by 
fire." Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Reversal", pages 3-4. However, since the complete 
lack of transcript here has "prejudice[d] [Russell's] ability to 
raise or identify" his issue relating to voir dire, a new trial 
is required. See Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445-47; cf. Menzies I, 845 
P.2d at 241 ("absent an indication that errors prejudice his 
ability to raise or identify appellate issues, the existence of 
transcription errors alone does not justify a new trial"). 
The above principles are consistent with the rules governing 
court reporters and the appellate process.3 Electronically 
3
 State v. Henry Lee Rudolph, Case No. 950057 (Utah 
September 2, 1995), is also consistent with the above discussion. 
In Rudolph, the supreme court ordered, "Because significant 
portions of the transcript are missing due to technical problems 
experienced by the court reporters' machinery, the Court, on 
motion of the defendant, vacates the conviction and remands the 
matter for retrial." Id. (supreme court order attached as 
Addendum C). 
"The court reporter [in Rudolph], as a result of a change in 
computer hardware, was unable to transcribe the voir dire portion 
of the trial as well as one half day of trial, . . . " Appellant 
Rudolph's "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Reversal, Motion to Suspend Time Limit, and 
Motion for Stay", page 2 (filed August 23, 1995). Rudolph's 
appeal challenged, inter alia, the lower court's removal of two 
prospective jurors, see Rudolph Memorandum, page 6, although he 
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taped proceedings must be maintained for nine years or as long as 
the case is "still pending or has been appealed". Rule 4-
201(2)(K)(ii) of the Code of Judicial Administration. "The 
operator shall maintain a separate log of each recorded 
proceeding . . . [and] file the original recording and log with 
the clerk of the court as part of the official court record." 
Rules 4-201(2) (H) & (I) of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Cf. Rule 4-201(1)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration (for 
an unstated time period, "The official verbatim record of court 
proceedings in the District Courts shall be maintained by the 
neither proved nor argued that the other jurors ultimately 
impanelled had been incompetent or biased. Nevertheless, the 
high court reversed and a harmless error analysis was not 
employed. See Addendum C. 
The same type of situation exists here. Due to technical 
mechanical problems, Mr. Russell's record contains 1 hour and 45 
minutes of blank tape instead of the voir dire proceeding which 
should be available for review. See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 
439 (Utah 1983). 
Rudolph is not necessarily relied upon because the above 
Point stands on its own. Cf. Rule 4-508 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration (unpublished opinions may not be used). 
Alternatively, to the extent that the use of Rudolph violates the 
rule, Mr. Russell challenges its application to this case for the 
reasons set forth in other decisions. State v. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d 568, 570 n.l (Utah 1991) ("Given the paucity of precedent in 
Utah, there seems little justification for their [unpublished 
opinions] use here"); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("If a decision truly adds 
nothing to the law, it should be disposed of from the bench or by 
a short written order that may be informative to the parties but 
to no one else"). The twist to the Paffel statement is that here 
the short written order of Rudolph, which "adds nothing to the 
law" of Taylor and Menzies I, was in fact informative to other 
parties. Besides applying to the transcript issue, Rudolph also 
preempts and forecloses the State's anticipatory argument of 
harmless error. As alluded to in Taylor and Menzies I, the 
reviewability requirement must first be met before the harmless 
error analysis is even considered. 
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official shorthand reporter assigned to serve each District 
Judge, . . . " ) ; Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1) (the rules of appellate 
procedure do not directly set a date certain for transcribing 
proceedings except to the extent that court reporters must 
maintain the record at least through the period of appeal). The 
problem here is that the videotaped proceedings were not 
maintained through the filing of his appeal. 
Besides the inability of counsel to review the for cause 
challenge of the prospective juror, appellate counsel is 
similarly precluded from identifying and analyzing other 
potential voir dire issues. Without a transcript available for 
independent review, there is no way to determine what the court, 
counsel, or prospective juror did or did not do below. See Hardy 
v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964) ("The right to notice 
'plain errors or defects7 is illusory if no transcript is 
available at least to one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case 
after the trial is ended"); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993) (plain error occurs if an error exists, it should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and it was harmful); United 
States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977) ("when a 
defendant is represented on appeal by counsel not involved at 
trial, counsel cannot reasonably be expected to show specific 
prejudice"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 
(actions or inactions by the attorney may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel). The blank tape of the voir dire 
proceedings and the accompanying inability to review the entire 
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record requires an order vacating the conviction and remanding 
the matter for a new trial. 
POINT II 
CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL FOR 
STRUCTURAL ERRORS, SUCH AS THE IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
Even though Mr. Russell's circumstances fit squarely under 
Taylor, see Point I, the State argues that "the missing 
transcript cannot affect the outcome of this case." Appellee's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Reversal ("Memorandum in Opposition"), page 4. However, the 
State discounted the thrust of Taylor which held "that a new 
trial [was] required because of our inability to review the 
appellant's claims about the voir dire", 664 P.2d at 447 
(emphasis added), and instead, the State argued a lack of 
prejudice. See Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition. 
A. Taylor CONTINUES TO GOVERN THE CASE AT BAR AND 
ITS HOLDING IS CONSISTENT WITH RECENT AUTHORITY 
The State's Memorandum in Opposition provides some 
background and a summary of its claim of harmless error: 
At issue is whether the trial court erred in denying 
[Allen Russell's] challenge for cause to prospective 
juror Scott Meredith (Appl. Docketing Statement, page 
5). During voir dire Mr. Meredith stated that his 
parents may have been the victims of arson when some of 
their property was destroyed by fire. [Although no 
transcript is available, the State does not dispute 
defendant's version of this fact.] Defense counsel made 
a motion to strike Meredith for cause and the trial 
judge denied the motion (Appl. Docketing Statement, 
page 3). Defense counsel used a peremptory strike to 
remove Meredith from the jury (Jury List, Attached as 
[Addendum E]). Meredith did not sit on the jury that 
convicted defendant of aggravated arson and theft 
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(Id.). 
As the juror in question did not sit on the jury, 
defendant cannot show any prejudice from the trial 
judge's denial of the motion to strike for cause. "To 
prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to 
remove a juror for cause, a petitioner must demonstrate 
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was 
partial or incompetent." State v. Menzies, [889 P.2d 
393] (Utah 1994) [Menzies II] . Defendant does not 
challenge any juror who actually sat. 
Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition, pages 3-4 (footnote 
included). 
Contrary to the State's claims, however, Taylor still 
governs Mr. Russell's case and like-situations where, due to the 
lack of transcript, the parties and the courts are both unable to 
perform the threshold requirement of reviewing the claims. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445; see generally Point I. Menzies I and 
Menzies II do little to detract from Taylor's preliminary 
requirement of reviewability by adequate transcript.4 
4
 The Menzies I case opined that in Taylor juror Linford's 
"recorded answers illustrated prejudice", see Menzies I, 845 P.2d 
at 228, 232 (construing Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445-47), although a 
careful reading of Taylor reveals that Linford's responses only 
required clarification or elaboration. Linford never expressed 
an actual bias or an inability to be impartial. See Taylor, 664 
P.2d at 445-47. Further, even if rehabilitation of juror Linford 
was required, the ensuing colloquy does not necessarily signal 
prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 55- n.l 
(Utah App. 1993) ("If a trial judge can formulate one question 
that properly satisfied the trial judge that the jurors are 
impartial, one is all that is required to successfully 
rehabilitate potential bias"); cf. Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447 (the 
basis for reversal in Taylor was the "inability to review the 
appellant's claims about the voir dire"). More important, if 
Taylor-type colloquies or such court attempts at clarification or 
rehabilitation did in fact "illustrate prejudice", the Menzies I 
interpretation has implicitly overruled a string of cases in 
which challenged jurors did not actually express bias but only a 
Taylor-type of uncertainty and hesitation. See, e.g., State v. 
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Importantly, the Menzies II opinion proceeded only after 
the Menzies I decision had determined that "The record is 
adequate to provide Menzies with a full and fair review of any 
claim relating to jury selection." Menzies I, 845 P.2d 220, 233 
(Utah 1992); Menzies II, 889 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1994) ("errors 
in recording and transcribing [did not make] the record 
inadequate for purposes of appellate review"). Consequently, 
Taylor's reviewability requirement remained undisturbed and the 
State's reliance on the harmless error analysis of Menzies II is 
inapposite to the case at bar. Unlike the blank tape here, the 
Menzies transcript was in fact adequate for appellate review 
despite its shortcomings. 
Conversely, ij£ the Menzies transcript had been inadequate, 
then the Menzies II harmless error analysis could have applied 
directly to the present case. Indeed, if a harmless error 
analysis alone would have sufficed, there would have been no need 
to even determine the adequacy of the Menzies transcript. 
Although Menzies II required a showing of prejudice when 
jurors are not removed for cause, 889 P.2d at 397-400, the 
reviewability requirement was no longer at issue. The Court 
simply refused to assume, arguendo, that the transcripts were 
inadequate. The Menzies II opinion did not proceed to the 
harmless error analysis without first considering the 
reviewability requirement of Taylor. A transcript must be 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 
440, 445-45 (Utah App. 1991) (citing cases). 
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adequate enough for appellate review before the harmless error 
analysis of Menzies II comes into play. 
B. Menzies II WAS IMPROPERLY DECIDED BECAUSE IT 
FAILED TO ADHERE TO CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW 
Aside from the above distinctions, the harmless error 
analysis of Menzies II should not be followed here because it 
failed to account for the contrary harmless error analysis from 
controlling United States Supreme Court opinions. See Powers v. 
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
500 U.S. , 114 L.Ed.2d 660, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991); Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. , 120 L.Ed.2d 33, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992); 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. , 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114 
S.Ct. (1994); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. , 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 
115 S.Ct. (1995); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 
(1991).5 
Appellant recognizes that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply 
5
 In its brief, dated July 15, 1993, the State in Menzies 
II cited Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to support its 
contention that Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), 
should be overruled. However, the State's briefed argument did 
not include the Powers, Edmonson, McCollum, Fulminante, and 
Vasquez decisions. These cases were similarly omitted from the 
Menzies II reply brief, dated October 13, 1993, and in his 
petition for rehearing, dated May 12, 1994. Cf. J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. , 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114 S.Ct. 
(1994) (decided on April 19, 1994). Thus, while the Utah Supreme 
Court knew that it was departing from Utah precedent, the Court 
may not have been aware of federal decisions since Ross which now 
mandate a different result. Cf. Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 399 
("Because the briefs in Crawford addressed the issue only 
tangentially and never cited the Hopt line of cases, it seems 
likely that Justice Ellett and the rest of the court did not even 
realize that they were departing from well-established Utah 
precedent"). 
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cannot overrule the law as announced by the highest court in the 
state," Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 
(Utah App. 1992), but, for preservation purposes and in the event 
further appellate consideration of the harmless error analysis is 
required, the contrary result suggested by the United States 
Supreme Court should prevail. 
In Menzies II, the Utah supreme court cited a purported 
majority approach which "reject[ed] the notion that the loss of a 
peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury." Menzies II, 889 P.2d 
at 398 (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)). 
"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact 
that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to 
achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was 
violated." [JRoss, 487 U.S. at 88] (citing ffopt v. Utah, 
120 U.S. 430, 436 . . . (1887)). To prevail on a claim 
of error based on the failure to remove a juror for 
cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., 
show that a member of the jury was partial or 
incompetent. See id., 487 U.S. at 89. . . We agree 
with the State and overrule Crawford [v. Manning, 542 
P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)] and its progeny [which require 
reversal whenever a party is compelled to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should 
have been stricken for cause]. 
Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 398. 
The court in Menzies II was persuaded by the Ross rationale 
and the claimed majority approach which rejected the result of 
Crawford. However, in its attack on Crawford, the Utah Supreme 
Court overlooked recent United States Supreme Court decisions 
which undercut the 1988 .Ross opinion and upheld in principle the 
remedy of Crawford. 
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1. Powers And Its Progeny Have Not Required A Showing 
Of Prejudice Or Juror Bias 
In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court devoted 
much attention to the concept of "injury-in-fact" and the harm 
suffered when a prosecutor uses its peremptory challenges to 
exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons solely on the 
basis of race. 499 U.S. at 410-16. The resulting "prejudice", 
the Court found, does not necessarily have to be reflected by a 
biased jury or through injury to the defendant. Id. 
Powers focused instead on "whether a criminal defendant has 
standing to raise the equal protection rights of a juror excluded 
from service . . . " Id. at 410 (emphasis added). Without 
requiring a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the Court 
concluded that the wrong to the jury system demanded reversal. 
Importantly, petitioner Powers did not claim and the Court did 
not determine that the selected jury had actually rendered a 
biased or partial verdict. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-13. 
For the case at bar, of particular import in Powers is the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J.). Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), was not cited in 
Justice Scalia7s dissent, but his minority opinion still 
attempted to continue Ross' harmless error approach. According 
to Justice Scalia: 
The sum and substance of the Court's lengthy analysis is 
that, since a denial of equal protection to other people 
occurred at the defendant's trial, though it did not 
affect the fairness of that trial, the defendant must go 
free. Even if I agreed that the exercise of peremptory 
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strikes constitutes unlawful discrimination (which I do 
not), I would not understand why the release of a 
convicted murderer who has not been harmed by those 
strikes is an appropriate remedy. 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 431 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); cf. id. at 403 (where the majority opinion noted, "The 
record does not indicate that race was somehow implicated in the 
crime or the trial"). 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dissent, the seven-person 
majority in Powers concluded that the affront to the jury system 
"casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process" and places 
the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." 499 U.S. at 
411) (citations omitted). In effect, the Powers opinion 
overruled sub silentio the Ross harmless error approach. 
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 114 L.Ed.2d 660 
(1991), the Court again declined to invoke a harmless error 
analysis in a case challenging the composition of a jury. The 
litigant there (Edmonson) did not claim and the Court did not 
hold that the jury ultimately impaneled had been biased. Rather, 
without determining whether Edmonson had been directly effected 
by the otherwise appropriately impaneled jury, the Edmonson Court 
reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the opposing 
party's use of peremptory challenges had improperly excluded 
jurors on account of their race. 114 L.Ed.2d at 680. 
Interestingly, the Edmonson opinion cited Ross, but relied 
on it only for the statement that "there is no constitutional 
obligation to allow them [peremptory challenges]." Edmonson, 114 
L.Ed.2d at 673 (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)). 
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The Edmonson decision cited the very page and paragraph in Ross 
which is at issue here, Edmonson, 114 L.Ed.2d at 673 (citing 
Ross, 487 U.S. at 88), yet instead of following the Ross holding, 
the Edmonson decision ignored altogether the result of Ross. 114 
L.Ed.2d at 680. 
Georgia v. McCollum, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), continued the 
holdings against improper juror selection. Recognizing that a 
jury impaneled through the use of discriminatory peremptory 
strikes is harmed at the outset, the McCollum Court held that 
criminal defendants, like civil litigants, see Edmonson, 114 
L.Ed.2d at 680, and State prosecutors, see Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 
424, may not use their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory 
fashion. McCollum, 120 L.Ed.2d at 51. "As in Powers and 
Edmonson, the extension of Batson in this context is designed to 
remedy the harm done to the 'dignity of persons' and to the 
'integrity of the court s./,f McCollum, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 44. 
Noteworthy in McCollum is the following quote taken from 
Powers: "One of the goals of our jury system is 'to impress upon 
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a 
verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with 
the law by persons who are fair.'" McCollum, 120 L.Ed.2d at 45 
(emphasis added) (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 413). As alluded 
to above, however, this "fairness" language from Powers did not 
impact the decision to reverse even though Justice Scalia's 
dissenting opinion had argued that petitioner Powers' conviction 
was in fact fair. See 499 U.S. at 431 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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McCollum's use of Powers' "fairness" statement served as an 
reminder that notwithstanding the "fairness" of the resulting 
proceedings, the harm to the jury system is in and of itself 
prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial. 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), is 
another recent decision forbidding the improper use of peremptory 
challenges. On behalf of a mother of a minor child, the state of 
Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against 
J.E.B. The State "used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove 
male jurors . . . [and] [a]s a result, all the selected jurors 
were female." 128 L.Ed.2d at 97. "The jury found petitioner to 
be the father of the child and the court entered an order 
directing him to pay child support." Id. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. "The 
verdict will not be accepted or understood [as fair] if the jury 
is chosen by unlawful means at the outset." J.E.B., 128 L.Ed.2d 
at 104 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 413). In dissent, however, 
Justice Scalia again advocated the harmless error approach of 
-Ross: 
Not only has petitioner, by implication of the Court's 
own reasoning, suffered no harm, but the scientific 
evidence presented at trial established petitioner's 
paternity with 99.92% accuracy. Insofar as petitioner 
is concerned, this is a case of harmless error if there 
ever was one; a retrial will do nothing but divert the 
State's judicial and prosecutorial resources, allowing 
petitioner or some other malefactor to go free. 
J.E.B., 128 L.Ed.2d at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.J.) (emphasis added). The J.E.B. 
Court certainly was aware of the dissent's harmless error 
23 
argument, but the majority nonetheless declined to recognize such 
a Ross-type of argument. In short, the force and effect of Ross 
has been replaced by the automatic reversal result of Powers and 
its progeny. 
2. Errors In Jury Selection Constitute "Structural 
Errors" And Such Errors Require Automatic Reversal 
Consistent with the teachings of Powers and its progeny is 
the decision of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).6 In 
Fulminante, the Court concluded that "structural defects" are not 
subject to a harmless error analysis because such a "defect 
affect [s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather 
than simply an error in the trial process itself [i.e. trial 
errors]." Id. at 310. Structural errors, like the improper 
selection of a jury, "defy analysis by 'harmless-error" standards 
[because] [t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end 
is obviously affected. . ." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10; see 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 412 ("The influence of the voir dire process 
may persist through the whole course of the trial proceedings"). 
The Fulminante opinion addressed the admissibility of a 
coerced confession and whether the evidence was subject to a 
harmless error analysis. Although the justices differed in their 
opinions as to whether the improperly admitted evidence required 
reversal, the entire Court recognized that in a context similar 
to the case at bar the harmless error analysis would not apply. 
6
 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), was decided 
on March 26, 1991. Six days later, on April, 1, 1991, the Court 
issued Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
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Cases "not subject to harmless error [include] the . . . unlawful 
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand 
jury[.]" Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by 
O'Conner, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia, J.J.) (citing Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); accord Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295 
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, J.J.) (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. 254). 
The present case requires the same result of reversal as 
that required by Vasguez. Errors committed during the grand jury 
stage are considered just as inexcusable as errors committed 
during the petit jury stage. See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263 
("Similarly, when a petit jury has been selected upon improper 
criteria . . . , we have required reversal of the conviction 
because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained"); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (citations 
omitted) ("The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons 
from participation in jury service on account of their race 'are 
essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries"). 
The dissent in Vasquez also raised the harmless error 
analysis, but such an analysis was rejected there even though "A 
petit jury [subsequently] found respondent guilty of that charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of which is 
unchallenged here." Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 467 (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). " [D]espite overwhelming evidence 
of his [Hillery7s] guilt[,] [t]he error at the grand jury stage 
struck at fundamental values of our society and 'undermine[d] the 
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structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and [was] 
not amenable to harmless-error review.'" Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 
263-64. 
The "structural integrity" language relied on in Vasquez and 
repeated in Fulminante is of the same cloth as the "integrity of 
the judicial process" language from Powers. See Vasquez, 474 
U.S. at 263-64; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295; Powers, 499 U.S. at 
411. Jurors may not be improperly excluded even if no problems 
exist with the jury actually selected. 
The decisions of Powers and its progeny (no harmless error 
analysis for the improper exercise of peremptory challenges), 
Fulminante (new trial granted for structural errors such as jury 
selection), and Vasquez (automatic reversal for wrongful 
exclusions of grand jurors), all support the Crawford v. Manning, 
542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), decision and overrule in principle the 
effect of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). 
Although Ross required a "defendant [to] demonstrate 
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or 
incompetent [,]" see Ross, 487 U.S. at 89, construed in Menzies 
II, 889 P.2d at 398, none of the jury trials in the 
aforementioned cases required such a showing. The Menzies II 
decision had relied on Ross, but it did so without the benefit of 
briefing addressing Vasguez, Fulminante, and Powers and its 
progeny. Cf. Menzies II, 889 P.2d at 399 ("Because the briefs in 
Crawford addressed the issue only tangentially and never cited 
the Hopt line of cases, it seems likely that Justice Ellett and 
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the rest of the court did not even realize that they were 
departing from well-established Utah precedent"). 
If Ross still existed as governing law, in principle it 
should have prohibited the analysis and the result in each of the 
cases involving a jury trial. For example, petitioner Powers, a 
white man, argued only that the State had improperly used its 
peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from the jury; 
however, the jury which ultimately convicted Powers was not 
accused of being partial or incompetent. Under Ross, however, 
Powers should have had to both allege and demonstrate that a 
seated juror was biased. Powers did neither. The dissent even 
argued "that the exclusion of members of a particular race from a 
jury does not produce an unfair jury, . . . " Powers, 499 U.S. at 
426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Nevertheless, Ross-like arguments were of no avail there since 
the use of a peremptory challenge to wrongly exclude a juror was 
"committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings." 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. The structural error required automatic 
reversal. 
In Edmonson, a civil litigant argued that peremptory 
challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on account of their 
race. "[F]airness of the proceedings" was again the prevailing 
concern, but only in the context of jury selection. 114 L.Ed.2d 
at 678. Fairness of the proceedings in terms of the result 
rendered by a otherwise appropriately chosen jury was not a focal 
point. Instead, the threat to the structure and to the jury 
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system was the emphasis. Id. 
McCollum stemmed from a prosecutorial appeal which occurred 
prior to trial. The Court admonitions remained consistent, 
though, in its protection of persons participating in the jury 
system. "Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a 
court allows jurors to be excluded [improperly by peremptory 
challenges directed at group bias, it could] undermine the very 
foundation of our system of justice--our citizens' confidence in 
it." 12 0 L.Ed.2d at 45. The theme of structural integrity 
resurfaced once more. 
J.E.B. reiterated the "structural" theme by forbidding 
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. The injury to the 
jury system is paramount, notwithstanding contentions that "this 
is a case of harmless error if there ever was one [.]" 128 
L.Ed.2d at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Powers and its progeny, and the overlapping requirement of 
automatic reversal for structural errors, Fulminante, 4 99 U.S. at 
310; Vasquez, 4 74 U.S. 254, have ignored Ross' requirement of 
proof of prejudice. Ross no longer controls. Governing United 
States Supreme Court opinions dictate a result contrary to the 
one announced in Menzies II. Cf. Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 940 (Utah 1993) ("The federal rulings 
set the floor for federal constitutional protection which we must 
respect in interpreting the scope of our own constitution's 
provisions"). The Menzies II holding requiring proof of juror 
bias or incompetence is not required. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Russell respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this *^ day of November, 1995. 
R O N i c TPT1 RON'S . FUJINC 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RON S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused 
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of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2<> day of November, 
1995. 
POM' Q RON'S. FUJINO 
DELIVERED by 
this day of November, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) l b appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) l b testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses ii 
his behalf; 
(f) Tb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or distric 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value 
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of 
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
(Added effective January 15, 1990.) 
__^ .www*«
 v u appccu* xue unginai papers ana ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of 
the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as 
the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this 
rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with colla-
tion in the following order: 
(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(B) the docket sheet; 
(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and 
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order. 
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of 
the collated record with a sequential number using one series of 
numerals for the entire record. 
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, 
the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the 
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and 
mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated supplemen-
tal record with a sequential number beginning with the number next 
following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The 
index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in 
the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper will 
be found. 
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the 
parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be in-
cluded by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed 
format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceed-
ings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with 
the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceed-
ings were otherwise recorded, the appellant flfmll request from a court 
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the 
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already 
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties 
approved by the appellate court, a person other than a certified court 
transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate 
court shall, upon request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. 
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by 
these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obli-
gated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant nortiona 
To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceed-
ings in all courts of record. 
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Official shorthand reporters. 
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the District 
Courts shall be maintained by the official shorthand reporter assigned to 
serve each District Judge, except that upon the request of a presiding 
judge and the majority of judges in a multi-judge district, and subject to 
the approval of the Council, the official record of any or all of the court 
proceedings in a District Court may be maintained by a suitable elec-
tronic recording device approved by the Council in lieu of an official 
shorthand reporter. 
(B) The Administrative Office may contract with private shorthand 
reporting firms for the purpose of maintaining the official verbatim 
record of court proceedings. The contract shall provide for the contracting 
firm to furnish reporters on an as needed basis upon notification to the 
court executive of the need for such services and for payment to the firm 
on a per diem basis. 
(C) The duties, responsibilities, benefits and supervision of official 
shorthand reporters employed by the judiciary shall be as provided for in 
this Code. 
(2) Electronic recording systems. 
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeals, Juvenile Court, and Circuit Court and before 
Court Commissioners shall be maintained by a suitable electronic record-
ing system as approved by the Council. 
(B) The Administrative Office shall periodically study the state of the 
art of electronic audio, visual or combination audio and visual recording 
technology and make recommendations to the Council of systems to be 
approved. 
(C) Other electronic recording equipment permitted in the courtroom 
shall not be used to report the official record when the proceedings are 
being recorded by the official electronic system approved by the Council. 
(D) The original tape and accompanying log or official shorthand re-
porter's notes shall be retained as part of the official record of the court. 
(E) Persons desiring a copy of the electronic recording tape shall make 
written application to the clerk of the court designating the case title, 
case number and tape number and make payment for the costs of duplica-
tion and postage. The judge may restrict distribution of copies of the 
record and transcripts of any matter not held in open court or in any 
matter determined by the judge to be inappropriate. 
(F) The clerk of the court or designated deputy court clerk shall operate 
the electronic recording system in the courtroom so as to accurately 
record the proceedings before the court. 
(G) The operator shall be adequately trained in the operation of the 
system. 
(H) The operator shall maintain a separate log of each recorded pro-
ceeding on a form containing essential information as approved by the 
Administrative Office. 
(I) The operator shall file the original recording and log with the clerk 
of the court as part of the official court record. The recording shall be kept 
in a secure area but need not be kept with the actual case file. 
(J) Only the clerk of the court or designee may release the original 
recording and log to the judge, or official court transcriber, or to the clerk 
of an Appellate Court. The clerk shall record the name of the recipient 
and when the recording and log were released and returned. 
(K) Tapes may be recycled and reused after the following periods of 
time have elapsed from the date of the last recording on the tape unless 
any case on the tape is still pending or has been appealed or the court has 
directed otherwise: 
(i) circuit court civil matters and juvenile court matters, two years; 
ftTIf? 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Sec. 9. [Appeals from district court—Prom justices' courts.] 
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record 
made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and 
fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Ap-
peals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the 
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall 
be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on 
both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions 
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
* * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ALLEN CARL RUSSELL, 
Defendants. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Trial No. 941901057 
App. No. * 
Date Transcript request received: 12-5-94 
Satisfactory payment arranged: YES 
If yes, 12-5-94-94 
CARLTON WAY, RPR CSR 
12-5-94 
cc: LDA for Appellant 
AG for Respondent 
FOR THE RECORD, AFTER SEARCH OF THE FIRST DAY OF 
TRIAL AND HAVING THE CLERKS SEARCH THE ORIGINAL 
ARCHIVED VIDEOTAPE, THE REQUESTED JURY VOIR DIRE HAS 
BEEN FOUND TO BE AN HOUR AND 4 5 MINUTES OF BLANK 
TAPE. I HAVE RECIEVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM APPELLANT 
TO TRANSCRIBE WHAT IS ON TAPE. I HAVE ALSO NOTIFIED 
THE AOC AND MR. JONES, PROSECUTOR, AND JUDGE NEWEY OF 
THIS EVENT. 
ADDENDUM C 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. No. 950057 
Henry Lee Rudolph, 941901206 
Defendant and Appellant. 
—ooOoo— 
ORDER 
Because significant portions of the transcript are missing due to technical 
problems experienced by the court reporters' machinery, the Court, on motion of the 
defendant, vacates the conviction and remands the matter for retrial. 
r/V/fr « '« • a c * * « »* <TCi 
Date/ f ^^micha^HJi. Zimmerman 
ci 
For the Court 
